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1 Introduction
Component-based development approaches aim to reduce the cost of complex systems design
by reusing prefabricated components. A software component is a black box unit of a third-
party composition and deployment, with explicit dependencies to its environment [16]. It is
exclusively reusable via its interface behavioral specification without disclosing implementation
details. However, the design by composition often rises mismatches. A safe interoperability
between components shall fulfill two main properties: (1) their interactions do not lead to
deadlocks, and (2) the substitution of a component with a new evolved one does not corrupt
the compound system operation.
Commonly, the functional interoperability of components is usually checked at the signature,
semantic and protocol levels. At the signature level, it is checked on the names and argument
types of component operations. At the semantic level, it is verified on the meanings of opera-
tions generally modeled by pre/postconditions and invariants. The protocol level regards the
scheduling of assumptions on environment inputs to a component, its output guarantees, and
its local operations. Protocols can be modeled naturally by interface automata [7] obedient to
an optimistic approach of composition closely related to the object-oriented context: if two or
more components communicate within an environment allowing them to avoid deadlocks, they
can be used without changes. This approach allows errors detection during the design phase,
and hence taking the appropriate decision: either keeping components as they were received
from their manufacturer, or requesting their modification.
The first contribution of the report is to demonstrate how object-oriented component-based
design (OOCBD) is sound by means of behavioral contracts merging interface automata with the
semantics of methods. The optimistic approach is accordingly adapted to fulfill the interaction
aspects of object-oriented components and the semantic layer of behavioral contracts. In [7, 8],
the composition of two interface automata excludes from their synchronized product all states
from which the environment cannot prevent deadlocks (semantic and protocol mismatches) by
enabling autonomous (output and local) actions. We show that some input actions may be also
seen as autonomous by regrouping them into method, return, and exception actions.
The second contribution regards refinement of behavioral contracts intended to ensure inde-
pendent implementability of components with respect to their abstract protocol and semantic
models. We introduce the expanding simulation between interface automata allowing the ad-
dition, in a refined behavioral contract of a component, of (i) more services than provided by
the abstract one, and (ii) body details (output or internal method calls) for common provided
methods with the abstract one. Hence, refinement relation is considered to be covariant on
input and output actions i.e., refinement issues (resp. provides) more outputs (resp. inputs)
than abstraction. An interface automaton A′ refines a second one A if each input, output, or
local event of A is simulated at least by the same one in A′. The alternating simulation [4], used
to refine interface automata in [7, 8], requires contravariance on output actions i.e., refinement
may issue fewer outputs than abstraction, which is quite inconsistent, from our angle, with the
object-oriented context.
All through the report, we justify the relevance of our approach for the design of railway
systems. We propose a case study of trains protection functions in modern railway CBTC
control systems to track the evolution of safety standards such as the European Norm EN
50128 [2], and launch a new industrial challenge for the design of such critical systems using an
object-oriented approach.
This work appeared partially in [6, 14] in preliminary formulations and other contexts. In
Section 2, we introduce our case study to not cluttering the contribution sections. It is recalled
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gradually to validate the various formal concepts. In sections 3 and 4, we proceed with the study
of behavioral contracts, and our approach of components compatibility and composition. Sec-
tion 5 is devoted to the study of refinement of behavioral contracts. Conclusions are presented
in Section 6.
T1
T2
Trains path
Coverage area of MCU
BTS
Wireless communication with T1
Event 1: sending coverage requests to MCU
Event 2: T1 and T2 are covered
Event 3: requesting VMAZs from MCU
Event 4: VMAZs of T1 and T2 from MCU
Event 5: computing VLMA
s1
s2
s3
s4 s5 s6
Velocity profile of T1
DEU
MCU
Wireless communication with T2
p1
TEL HEL s7
TEL HEL
VLMA of T1
Boundary between
VMAZ1 and VMAZ2
Figure 1: Simplified trains protection in CBTC systems.
2 Railway case study
In this section, we introduce a simplified case study of trains protection functions in CBTC
(Communications-Based Train Control) systems [1], used to illustrate our work (cf. Figure 1).
These systems are the next generation of railway control technology which is increasingly be-
ing adopted in subways and other similar means of transportation, as well as many industrial
major projects worldwide, such as ERTMS/ETCS (European Rail Traffic Management Sys-
tem/European Train Control System) [10, 9]. A CBTC system is an automatic train controller
independent of track circuits. It determines continuously, in real-time, precise locations of trains,
and sends them back control signals by means of bidirectional train-to-wayside data communica-
tions. It has train-borne and wayside processor devices implementing automatic train protection
(ATP) functions, as well as automatic train operation (ATO), and automatic train supervision
(ATS) functions. ATP devices ensure safety-critical requirements (speed control and braking).
ATO devices cover non safety-related requirements (doors opening and closing, etc). ATS de-
vices handle the traffic management when necessary [1]. CBTC systems reduce significantly
the amount of wayside equipments and allows benefits such as high traffic densities, better
headways, reliability of anti-collision processing, adoption of automated trains, etc.
We consider trains control based on moving block regime. The positions of a train and its
velocity are continuously computed, based on its kinetic and potential energy, and communi-
cated via wireless to wayside equipments. Thus, a protected area of circulation is established
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for each train up to the next nearest obstacle. The train is consequently able to adapt its speed
and braking curves in order to not overcome the limit of this area, called the danger point [15].
The On-Board Device (OBD) of each train computes two fictional locations: the tail and
head external locations (TEL and HEL). The track fragment between them covers the whole
train. Usually, this choice is caught on grounds of safety to keep a safe distance between trains
in case of system malfunction. Locations are coordinates on trains path composed of segments
and set in a given direction according to railroad switches positions. A segment is identified by
a number, a length, and a beginning coordinate. In Figure 1, the switch p1 is positioned on the
segment s3, and trains path is the sequence s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, etc.
The OBDs of T1 and T2 initiate the protection process by asking if they are visible to a
Movement Control Unit (MCU). There are several MCUs covering the entire line, with overlap-
ping coverage sections allowing safe information handover between them. For simplicity, only
one is represented in our case study. Trains locations are sent by wireless to the nearest Base
Transmission Station (BTS). The latter converts radio signals to digital data and transmits
them to the Data Exchange Unit (DEU), which in turn transfers them to MCU (event 1).
MCU determines whether the zone between TEL and HEL is completely or partially included
within its coverage area, and responds T1 and T2. In Figure 1, trains T1 and T2 are both
visible to MCU (event 2).
Next, each train asks from its covering MCUs the Vital Movement Authority Zone (VMAZ):
the area (sequence of segments) in which the train can safely circulate (event 3). In Figure 1,
MCU sends to T1 a VMAZ limited by the beginning of s1 (containing its TEL and HEL) and
the end of s3, and sends to T2 a VMAZ limited by the beginning of s4 (containing its TEL)
and the end of s5, the last segment covered by MCU (event 4). MCU ensures that VMAZs of
successive trains never overlap to avoid collisions. VMAZs are computed by chaining segments
according to route informations. Chaining may be interrupted up to the nearest obstacle on the
train trajectory: the end of MCU coverage area, an uncontrolled switch, or the beginning of the
segment containing TEL of the next train, etc. This function is covered by a separate wayside
component managing persistent informations (segment and switch locations) and variant ones
(switch positions) of the route during the traffic.
Finally, the train computes the danger point, namely the Vital Limit of Movement Authority
(VLMA), within VMAZ. To locate VLMA, OBD takes a fixed safety margin beforehand the
limit of its VMAZ. The train velocity is gradually reduced to reach zero when HEL reaches
VLMA (event 5).
3 Behavioral Contracts
In this section, we present behavioral contracts combining protocols of object-oriented compo-
nents, described by interface automata, with the semantics of methods. We start by introducing
the formalism of interface automata.
3.1 Interface automata
Interface automata [7] model communication protocols of object-oriented components in terms
of temporal scheduling of their input, output, and hidden actions. In OOCBD, input actions
may represent component public provided methods, assignment of return values of their calls,
and catching their exceptions. Output actions may represent method calls, and return or
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exception events. Private methods are implicit and not specified by actions. However, their
calls, assignment of their return values, and catching of their thrown exceptions are modeled by
hidden actions.
Definition 1. An interface automaton A is a tuple (ΥA, ıA,ΣIA,ΣOA,ΣHA, δA) where: ΥA is a
finite set of states; ıA ∈ ΥA is the initial state; ΣIA, ΣOA, and ΣHA are resp. sets of input, output,
and hidden actions; δA ⊆ ΥA × ΣA ×ΥA is the set of transitions. A is empty iff ΥA = ∅.
The alphabet of A consists of “a?” for all a ∈ ΣIA, “a!” for all a ∈ ΣOA, and “a;” for all a ∈ ΣHA.
Sets ΣImA ⊆ ΣIA, ΣOmA ⊆ ΣOA, and ΣHmA ⊆ ΣHA, are resp. actions of public provided methods, call
of environment public methods, and calls of private methods. The set ΣmA of method actions of
A is defined by ΣImA ∪ ΣOmA ∪ ΣHmA .
Given a set of variables V , we define by T[v] the type of v ∈ V i.e., v:T[v], and by TJV K =∏
v∈V T[v] the type of V (cartesian product of T[v] for all v ∈ V ). The signature of a method
action a ∈ ΣmA is a(i1:T[i1], ..., ik:T[ik]) → o:T[o] ] e. The set of input parameters of a is
ΨiA(a) = {i1, ..., ik}. The set of return parameters ΨoA(a) of a is the singleton {o}. We define
RA(a) = o the return action of a, and EA(a) = e the exception action of a. The set of attributes
used by a is denoted by ΛA(a) if a ∈ ΣImA ∪ ΣHmA . The absence of parameters, attributes, or
exceptions is represented by a void. If RA(a) and EA(a) are defined, we set ΣrA and ΣeA resp. to
{RA(a) | a ∈ ΣmA} and {EA(a) | a ∈ ΣmA}.
We denote, by Σ∗rA and Σ∗eA , resp. ΣrA∩Σ∗A and ΣeA∩Σ∗A where ∗ ∈ {I,O,H}. Thus, we deduce
obviously that ΣA = ΣmA ∪ΣrA ∪ΣeA. We set SuccA(s, a) = t such that (s, a, t) ∈ δA. A run σ of
A is a finite alternated sequence s0[a0]...[an−1]sn of states and actions where (sk, ak, sk+1) ∈ δA
for all k ∈ N<n. We denote, by ΣA〈σ〉, the set {ak ∈ ΣA | k ∈ N<n} and, by ΘA(s), the set of
runs reaching s ∈ ΥA from ıA. A state s ∈ ΥA is reachable in A if ΘA(s) 6= ∅.
Assumptions: Interface automata are deterministic, i.e., for all (s, a, t1), (s, a, t2) ∈ δA,
t1 = t2. All states s ∈ ΥA are reachable in A. Consider an action a ∈ ΣmA where RA(a) and
EA(a) are defined. If a ∈ ΣImA (resp. ΣOmA and ΣHmA ), then EA(a) ∈ ΣOA \ ΣmA (resp. ΣIA \ ΣmA
and ΣHA \ ΣmA): a component providing or requiring a knows its exception. If a ∈ ΣImA , then
RA(a) ∈ ΣOA \ ΣmA : the method a must output its return value. If a ∈ ΣOmA ∪ ΣHmA , then RA(a)
may belong or not to (ΣIA∪ΣHA)\ΣmA : a component calling a may require or not the assignment
of its return value.
Well-formedness
Object-oriented implementation rules should be covered by runs of interface automata. A
provided public non-void method should be specified at least by a sequence of events starting
and ending resp. by an input method action and an output return one, and interposed by
calls of local private or environment public methods and assignment of their return values.
They may be interleaved optionally by catching or throwing exceptions events. A call of a
non-void method, made by a component requiring assignment of its return value, is followed
necessarily by a return input action, and optionally by an exception catch one. All actions of
a component are autonomous (controllable), except method or exception input actions. It’s up
to the environment to enable or not these actions. In [7, 8], only output and hidden actions
are required to be autonomous. From our perspective, input return actions of non-void method
calls, made by a component, are also autonomous because the environment is expected to
provide their return values and the component has the option to assign them or not.
The set ΣautA of autonomous actions is ΣA \ (ΣImA ∪ ΣIeA). We define by Σ∗A(s) where ∗ ∈
{I,O,H, Im,Om,Hm, Ir,Or,Hr, Ie,Oe,He,m, r, e, aut} the set of actions in Σ∗A enabled from
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s ∈ ΥA. ΣA(s) is the set of all enabled actions from s. The run σ = s0[a0]...[an−1]sn is called
autonomous in A if ΣA〈σ〉 ⊆ ΣautA for all k ∈ N<n. It is called exception-free if ΣA〈σ〉 ⊆ ΣA \ΣeA
for all k ∈ N<n. A state t ∈ ΥA is reachable autonomously (resp. without exceptions) from
s ∈ ΥA in A if there is an autonomous (resp. exception-free) run between s and t.
Definition 2. An interface automaton A is well-formed iff for all s ∈ ΥA, and a ∈ ΣmA(s) where
RA(a) ∈ ΣrA, there is at least a state t ∈ ΥA, where RA(a) ∈ ΣrA(t), reachable autonomously
without exceptions from SuccA(s, a).
3.2 Method semantics
The semantics of a provided method consists of: (i) a precondition representing environment
assumptions on input parameters, (ii) an abstract specification of the return parameter com-
putation using input parameters and attributes, (iii) a termination postcondition on the return
parameter depending on input parameters and attributes, and (iv) an extra postcondition de-
scribing exception conditions on parameters and attributes. A method call semantics is defined
only by a precondition on input parameters and a postcondition on input and return parameters.
Given a set of variables V , a condition on v is a subtype of T[v]. A condition Q on V is a
subtype of TJV K. We denote by Q[w1, ..., wn] (or QJW K), the projection of Q on variables in
W = {w1, ..., wn} ⊆ V . These conditions can be concretely defined as predicates in theories
adapted to the variable types. Consider the set Z ⊆W , and two conditions P and Q subtypes
of TJV K, we set the following equivalences to define semantic formulas in the rest of the report:
• ⊥JW K ≡ P JW K = ∅; >JW K ≡ P JW K = TJW K;
• ¬P JW K ≡ TJW K \ P JW K;
• P JZK ∧QJW K ≡ (P JZK×QJW \ ZK) ∩QJW K;
• P JZK ∨QJW K ≡ (P JZK×QJW \ ZK) ∪QJW K;
• P JW K⇒ QJW K ≡ P JW K ⊆ QJW K.
Definition 3. Given an interface automaton A, an input semantics Ia = (Pa, Sa, Qa, Ea) of an
action a ∈ ΣImA is defined by:
• a precondition Pa ⊆ TJΨiA(a)K;
• a specification Sa ⊆ TJΨiA(a) ∪ ΛA(a) ∪ΨoA(a)K;
• a termination postcondition Qa ⊆ TJΨiA(a) ∪ ΛA(a) ∪ΨoA(a)K;
• an exception postcondition Ea ⊆ TJΨiA(a) ∪ ΛA(a) ∪ΨoA(a)K.
An output semantics Ob = (Pb, Qb) of an action b ∈ ΣOmA is defined by:
• a precondition Pb ⊆ TJΨiA(b)K;
• a postcondition Qb ⊆ TJΨiA(b) ∪ΨoA(b)K.
These conditions are denoted resp. by Ia.P , Ia.S, Ia.Q, Ia.E, Ob.P , and Ob.Q.
In the previous definition, we consider only the semantics of observable method actions
(a ∈ ΣImA ∪ ΣOmA ). We omit the semantics of private method actions (a ∈ ΣHmA ) because they
are not relevant for interoperability. We define behavioral contracts as follows.
Definition 4. A behavioral contract B of a component is a tuple (A, I,O) such that A is an
interface automaton, I is a map associating each a ∈ ΣImA to an input semantics Ia, and O is
a map associating each a ∈ ΣOmA to an output semantics Oa. We denote by, B.A, the interface
automaton of B, B.I, the map I of B, and B.O, the map O of B.
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Definition 5. Given a behavioral contract B and an action a ∈ ΣImA where B.A = A and
B.I(a) = (Pa, Sa, Qa, Ea), for all (i, f, o) ∈ ΨiA(a)× ΛA(a)×ΨoA(a),
• a is correct with respect to B.I(a) iff Pa[i] ∧ Sa[i, f, o]⇒ Qa[i, f, o];
• a throws exceptions with respect to B.I(a) iff Pa[i] ∧ Sa[i, f, o]⇒ Ea[i, f, o];
• a terminates with respect to B.I(a) iff Pa[i] ∧ Sa[i, f, o]⇒ Qa[i, f, o] ∧ ¬Ea[i, f, o].
The previous definition establishes the different relations between the specification and
pre/postconditions of an input method action a ∈ ΣImA . Stated conditions are based on the
Hoare triplet [11]: a provided method is correct if its behavior under the precondition ensures
the termination postcondition, it throws exceptions if the exception postcondition is satisfied,
and terminates if it is correct and the exception postcondition is not satisfied.
3.3 Design of the railway case study
The UML-like component architecture in Figure 2 represents ATP protection equipments men-
tioned in Section 2. We count four component classes: OnBoardDevice, DataExchangeUnit,
MovementControlUnit, and SubRouteBuilder instantiated resp. by components OBD, DEU,
MCU, and SRB. The last three ones implement resp. interfaces DataExchange, MovementCon-
trol, and RouteBuilder.
The component DEU implements the public (+) method covReq (coverage request), whose
arguments are: tel and ts, resp. the coordinate of TEL and the identifier of the segment
containing TEL, hel and hs, resp. the coordinate of HEL and the identifier of the segment
containing HEL, and t, the train identifier. According to the interface automaton Ad of DEU
(cf. Figure 3(b)), the method covReq transfers the coverage request to MCU by invoking
the method isCovered. MCU responds OBD, via DEU, by returning 2 (resp. 1) if it covers
completely (resp. partially) the train (signal covered), or by throwing uncovered if not.
Subsequently, if the train is covered by MCU, OBD requests its VMAZ (vmazReq). DEU
transfers the request by calling computeVmaz implemented by MCU. In turn, MCU calls the
method chain of SRB to perform chaining on segments in order to compute VMAZ bounds
within the sequence of segments from start to end (arguments of chain). If MCU covers only
HEL, start is set to the first segment in trains path fully covered by MCU. It is set to ts
otherwise. The argument end is set to the segment containing the next obstacle. According
to Am in Figure 3(c), if chaining is interrupted by an uncontrolled switch, MCU handles the
exception uncontSW expected to be thrown by chain and in turn, throws default.
Based on the path database bdd, SRB returns segments of VMAZ in the table segs of size
max, the maximum number of segments covered by MCU. The field useful nb ≤ max indicates
the number of segments included in VMAZ. MCU computes accordingly the VMAZ bounds
coordinates on the path frame based on informations of useful segments (identifiers, beginning
coordinates, and lengths saved in data structures of type Seg). In the case where MCU covers
only a part of the train VMAZ, it returns a pair vmaz of coordinates where one of them is null
and the other is a positive real. Otherwise, both of them are positive reals. The map attribute
cst (covered segments and trains) is finally updated such that segments covered both by MCU
and VMAZ of the train are associated to its identifier.
According to Ao in Figure 3(a), OBD fixes VLMA by calling its private (−) method
computeVlma within VMAZ. Consequently, it controls the train speed if HEL is sufficiently
far from VLMA (ctrlVelocity), or performs an emergency brake (emgcyBrake) otherwise.
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OnBoardDevice
-deu:DataExchangeUnit
-computeVlma(vmaz bounds:realˆ2)
-ctrlVelocity(vlma:real,curr velocity:real)
-emgcyBrake()
Component
OBD
Component
DEU
DataExchangeUnit
-mcu:MovementControlUnit
+covReq(t:nat,tel:real,ts:nat,hel:real,hs:nat):nat
+vmazReq(t:nat):realˆ2
MovementControlUnit
-cst:{seg:int 7→ train:int}ˆmax
-srb:SubRouteRuilder
+isCovered(t:nat,tel:real,ts:nat,hel:real,hs:nat):nat
+computeVmaz(t:nat):realˆ2
Component
MCU
SubRouteBuilder
-bdd:{seg:Seg 7→ sw:Switch}ˆmaxs
+chain(start:nat,end:nat):{segs:Segˆmax,useful nb:nat}
Component
SRB
DataExchange
MovementControl
RouteBuilder
Figure 2: UML-like component architecture.
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56
covReq!
covered? vmazReq!
vmaz?computeVlma;ctrlVelocity;
emgcyBrake;
uncovered?
IN: covered,uncovered,vmaz
OUT: covReq,vmazReq
HID: computeVlma,ctrlVelocity,emgcyBrake
a b c d
e
f
ghi
covReq? isCovered! yes?
no?uncovered!
covered!
vmazReq?computeVmaz!result?vmaz!
IN: covReq, vmazReq, yes, no, result, default
OUT: isCovered, computeVmaz, covered, uncovered, vmaz
1 2 3 4 5
7
6
isCovered?
no!
yes! computeVmaz? chain!
uncontSW?default!
vmazSegs?result!
IN: isCovered, computeVmaz, vmazSegs, uncontSW
OUT: chain, yes, no, result, default
(a) Ao (OBD) (b) Ad (DEU) (c) Am (MCU)
Figure 3: Interface automata of OBD, DEU, and MCU: method actions (double transitions);
return actions (simple transitions); exception actions (dashed transitions).
Table 1: Semantics of the method action covReq.
Output semantics Bo.O Input semantics Bd.I
Bo.O(covReq).P ≡ t ∈ {0, ..., 30}∧ Bd.I(covReq).P ≡ t ∈ {0, ..., 30}∧
ts, hs ∈ {0, ..., 500}∧ ts, hs ∈ {0, ..., 500}∧
tel, hel ∈ [0, 5000] ∧ tel < hel tel, hel ∈ [0, 5000]
Bd.I(covReq).S ≡ ⊥[t, tel, hel, ts, hs, covered]
Bo.O(covReq).Q ≡ covered ∈ {0, 1, 2} Bd.I(covReq).Q ≡ covered ∈ {1, 2}
Bd.I(covReq).E ≡ covered = 0
Let us consider three behavioral contracts Bo, Bd, and Bm resp. for components OBD,
DEU, and MCU where Bo.A is Ao, Bd.A is Ad, and Bm.A is Am. Table 1 shows an example of
the semantics of the method covReq in Bo and Bd whose signature is covReq (t, tel, ts, hel, hs)→
covered ] uncovered (parameter types are given in Figure 2). The semantics of covReq in Bo
and Bd states that minimal and maximal identifiers t of trains, are resp. 0 and 30, and those
of segment identifiers (ts and hs), are resp. 0 and 500. The precondition of covReq in Bo states
that conditions tel, hel ∈ [0, 5000] and tel < hel have to be satisfied by calling the method, where
5000um (unit of measurement) is the size of the longest trains path. In Bd, the precondition
states simply that tel, hel ∈ [0, 5000]. In Bo, the termination postcondition of covReq states
that the return parameter covered is a signal in {0, 1, 2}. However, it states only that covered
is a signal in {1, 2} in Bd, because if it is equal to 0, the exception uncovered is thrown. The
specification Bd.I(covReq).S is not defined (⊥[t, tel, hel, ts, hs, covered]): at the level of Bd, there
is no parameter or attribute (ΛAd(covReq) = ∅) describing how the return parameter covered
is computed. MCU, after receiving the coverage request from OBD, is expected to ask SRB to
check in bdd whether tel and hel are really placed resp. on ts and hs, as claimed by OBD. This
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functionality of SRB does not appear intentionally at this stage. We expect using this detail to
justify our refinement approach presented in Section 5.
Finally, by considering that RAo(covReq) is covered ∈ ΣrAo , RAo(vmazReq) is vmaz ∈ ΣrAo ,
and EAo(covReq) is uncovered ∈ ΣeAo , we deduce that Ao is well-formed. The reader can easily
deduce the well-formedness of Ad and Am by finding their method, return and exception actions.
4 Components Composition
The composition of two behavioral contracts may induce deadlock situations caused by potential
semantic or protocol incompatibilities. At the protocol level, the composition of two interface
automata may contain deadlock states from which one of them requests an input not accepted
by the other. For example, a component calls a method throwing exceptions without handling
them. In Java, a deadlock is the detection of a method call exception not included in a clause
try/catch. The thrown exception is the output action and the try/catch freedom account for
the absence of the corresponding input action.
At the semantic level, the synchronization of shared input/output method actions with in-
compatible semantics, leads to deadlock states. A component outputting a method call have
more informations about its arguments. Thus, the call precondition is stronger than that of
the method implementation: the environment is expected to provide input arguments included
in the implementation precondition. In return, the component providing the method commu-
nicates to the environment a postcondition on its return parameter: it vouches to provide only
return values that satisfy the postcondition. The calling component cannot have more detailed
informations about the return parameter than the implementing one. That’s why the postcon-
dition of a method invocation is weaker than that provided by its implementation. Note that
preconditions, like postconditions, of provided observable methods are required to be satisfiable.
Not all calling environments satisfy the precondition, or expect return guarantees larger than
the postcondition [8]. In this case, synchronization disparities are detected.
4.1 Synchronization of interface automata and semantic compatibility
The synchronization of two interface automata A1 and A2 is possible only if they are mutually
composable i.e., ΣIA1 ∩ ΣIA2 = ΣOA1 ∩ ΣOA2 = ΣHA1 ∩ ΣA2 = ΣHA2 ∩ ΣA1 = ∅. The set of shared
input/output actions in A1 and A2 is Shared(A1, A2) = (ΣIA1∩ΣOA2)∪(ΣIA2∩ΣOA1). For simplicity,
we denote the couple of states (s1, s2) by s1s2. By synchronizing A1 and A2, transitions labeled
by shared actions synchronize and the others are interleaved.
The synchronized product A1⊗A2 of A1 and A2 is an interface automaton where ΥA1⊗A2 =
ΥA1 ×ΥA2 , ıA1⊗A2 = ıA1ıA2 , ΣIA1⊗A2 = (ΣIA1 ∪ΣIA2) \ Shared(A1, A2), ΣOA1⊗A2 = (ΣOA1 ∪ΣOA2) \
Shared(A1, A2), ΣHA1⊗A2 = Σ
H
A1 ∪ ΣHA2 ∪ Shared(A1, A2), and (s1s2, a, t1t2) ∈ δA1⊗A2 iff :
• a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∧ (s1, a, t1) ∈ δA1 ∧ (s2, a, t2) ∈ δA2 ;
• a 6∈ Shared(A1, A2)∧ ((s1, a, t1) ∈ δA1 ∧ s2 = t2 ∨ (s2, a, t2) ∈ δA2 ∧ s1 = t1).
Given tow behavioral contracts B1 and B2 where B1.A = A1 and B2.A = A2, B1 and
B2 are composable if A1 and A2 are composable, and each a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∩ ΣmA1 has the
same signature in A1 and A2. We deduce, from the composability of B1 and B2, that for each
a ∈ ΣmA1 ∩ Shared(A1, A2), if RAi(a),EAi(a) ∈ ΣAi for all i ∈ {1, 2}, then RA1(a) = RA2(a) = ra,
EA1(a) = EA2(a) = ea and ra, ea ∈ Shared(A1, A2). In the following definition, we provide
semantic compatibility conditions on input/output method actions shared between A1 and A2.
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Definition 6. Given a ∈ Shared(A1, A2) ∩ ΣmA1, for all (i, o) ∈ ΨiA1(a) × ΨoA1(a), if one of
the following conditions holds, then a in B1 is semantically compatible with a in B2 i.e.,
SemCompa(B1, B2):
• B1.O(a).P [i]⇒ B2.I(a).P [i]∧ B1.O(a).Q[i, o]⇐ B2.I(a).Q[i, o], if a ∈ ΣOmA1 ;
• B1.I(a).P [i]⇐ B2.O(a).P [i]∧ B1.I(a).Q[i, o]⇒ B2.O(a).Q[i, o], if a ∈ ΣImA1.
Example 1. According to our case study (cf. Section 3.3), Bo.A and Bd.A are composable.
The set Shared(Ao, Ad) is defined by {covReq, vmazReq, covered, uncovered, vmaz}. Based on
Table 1, SemCompa(Bo, Bd) is true for a = covReq.
a1 b1 c2 d3
e1
f3 g3 h4 h5
h6
h7i1
covReq? isCovered; yes;
no;uncovered!
covered! vmazReq? computeVmaz; chain!
uncontSW?
vmazSegs?result;vmaz!
IN: covReq, vmazReq, vmazSegs,uncontSW
OUT: covered, uncovered, vmaz, chain
HID: isCovered, yes, no, result, default
Figure 4: Interface automaton (Bd|Bm).A.
Definition 7. Assume that B1 and B2 are composable, we define by B1|B2, the synchronized
behavioral contract of B1 and B2 where:
• (B1|B2).A is defined by A1 ⊗A2 restricted to the set of reachable states from ıA12;
• (B1|B2).I is defined by:
– B1.I(a) for all a ∈ ΣImA1 \ Shared(A1, A2);
– B2.I(a) for all a ∈ ΣImA2 \ Shared(A1, A2);
• (B1|B2).O is defined by:
– B1.O(a) for all a ∈ ΣOmA1 \ Shared(A1, A2);
– B2.O(a) for all a ∈ ΣOmA2 \ Shared(A1, A2).
We denote (B1|B2).A by A12 for simplicity. Deadlock states in A12 represent possible
deadlocks during the communication between components specified by B1 and B2 at the protocol
and semantic levels. They are states s1s2 such that (i) there exists at least a ∈ Shared(A1, A2)
enabled from s1 and not from s2 or inversely, or (ii) a is a method action enabled from s1 and
s2 but, the condition SemCompa(B1, B2) is not satisfied.
The latter condition on semantics compatibility requires that the calling component shall
define properly the output semantics of the method call with respect to the input semantics
imposed by its environment: this allows the detection of the assumptions on components ex-
changed data as early as possible, and make the design more reliable.
Definition 8. The set of deadlock states Dead(A1, A2) in A12 is {s1s2 ∈ ΥA12 | (∃ a ∈
Shared(A1, A2). D1(s1s2) ∨D2(s1s2))} where
D1(s1s2) ≡ (a ∈ ΣOA1(s1)∧a /∈ ΣIA2(s2))∨(a ∈ ΣOmA1 (s1)∧a ∈ ΣImA2(s2)∧¬SemCompa(B1, B2));
D2(s1s2) ≡ (a ∈ ΣOA2(s2)∧a /∈ ΣIA1(s1))∨(a ∈ ΣOmA2 (s2)∧a ∈ ΣImA1(s1)∧¬SemCompa(B1, B2)).
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Example 2. Interface automata Ad and Am are composable (cf. Figure 3). Let us consider
two composable behavioral contracts Bd and Bm where Bd.A = Ad and Bm.A = Am. By
supposing that actions isCovered and computeVmaz are semantically compatible between Bd
and Bm, the state h6 is the only deadlock state in (Bd|Bm).A: the exception action default ∈
ΣeAm(6) ∩ Shared(Ad, Am) is not enabled from the state h in Ad (cf. Figure 4).
4.2 Optimistic approach of composition
The incremental bottom-up design means that the compatibility checking between components
can be performed for partial descriptions of the system. The optimistic approach of interface
automata composition is closely consistent with the incremental design oncoming.
In this approach, the presence of deadlock states in A12 doesn’t imply necessarily that B1
and B2 are incompatible: the existence of a suitable environment E providing good input steps
and semantics for A12 such that deadlock states are prevented, implies that they are compatible.
E must satisfy the following conditions: (1) E and B1|B2 are composable, (2) E.A is non-empty
interface automaton, (3) Dead(A12, E.A) = ∅, and (4) no state in the set Dead(A1, A2)×ΥE.A
is reachable in ((B1|B2)|E).A [7].
1 2
chain?
vmazSegs!
IN: chain
OUT: vmazSegs, uncontSW
Figure 5: Interface automaton As of SRB.
Example 3. We assume that SRB does not throw the exception uncontSW if an uncontrolled
switch is met during chaining. The train VAMZ is limited by the switch position: for example,
if p1 is uncontrolled, VMAZ of T1 is bounded by the end of segment s2 (cf. Figure 1). Let
us consider a behavioral contract Bs for SRB composable with Bd|Bm where Bs.A = As (cf.
Figure 5) and the condition SemCompa(Bd|Bm, Bs) is valid for a = chain. Bs is a suitable
environment for Bd|Bm. In ((Bd|Bm)|Bs).A, states h61 and h62 are not reachable, because
from the state 2 in As, the action uncontSW is not enabled. Consequently, Bd and Bm are
compatible behavioral contracts.
In the product A12, all states s1s2 from which deadlock states are autonomously reachable
(cf. Section 3.1), are considered as incompatible and must be removed from A12. No envi-
ronment can prevent reaching deadlocks from these states. A state s1s2 ∈ ΥA12 is compatible
in A12 if there is no state d1d2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2) autonomously reachable from s1s2. We de-
note, by Cmp(A1 ,A2 ), the set of compatible states in A12. B1 and B2 are compatible iff they
are composable and ıA12 ∈ Cmp(A1 ,A2 ). The interface automaton of the composition of two
behavioral contracts is restricted to compatible states of their synchronized product.
Definition 9. The composition B1‖B2 of two compatible behavioral contracts B1 and B2 is
defined by (B1‖B2).I = (B1|B2).I, (B1‖B2).O = (B1|B2).O, and (B1‖B2).A is an interface
automaton where Υ(B1‖B2).A is restricted to Cmp(A1 ,A2 ), ı(B1‖B2).A = ıA12, Σ∗(B1‖B2).A = Σ
∗
A12
for ∗ ∈ {I,O,H}, and δ(B1‖B2).A = {(s, a, t) ∈ δA12 | s, t ∈ Cmp(A1 ,A2 )}.
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a1 b1 c2 d3
e1
f3 g3 h4 h5
h7i1
covReq? isCovered; yes;
no;uncovered!
covered! vmazReq? computeVmaz; chain!
vmazSegs?result;vmaz!
IN: covReq, vmazReq, vmazSegs,uncontSW
OUT: covered, uncovered, vmaz, chain
HID: isCovered, yes, no, result, default
Figure 6: Interface automaton (Bd‖Bm).A.
Example 4. The interface automaton (Bd‖Bm).A is the restriction of (Bd|Bm).A to the set
Υ(Bd|Bm).A \{h6} of compatible states (cf. Figure 6). Assume that Ad is not well-formed and do
not expect to assign the return value of computeVmaz, h7 is a deadlock state in (Bd|Bm).A. In
this case, states h5, h4, and g3 are incompatible (the path between g3 and h7 is autonomous):
the call of vmazReq leads inevitably to deadlocks for all possible environments.
The following property states the preservation of interface automata well-formedness by
composition of behavioral contracts.
Theorem 1. If B1 is compatible with B2 and B1.A and B2.A are well-formed, then (B1‖B2).A
is also well-formed.
Proof. We denote (B1‖B2).A by A′12. Given s1s2 ∈ ΥA′12 and a ∈ ΣmA′12(s1s2) where RA′12(a) ∈
ΣrA′12 , we have to prove that, there is at least t1t2 ∈ ΥA′12 , where RA′12(a) ∈ ΣA′12(t1t2), reach-
able from SuccA′12(s1s2, a) by an autonomous exception-free run? We have the following as-
sumptions: (i) if a ∈ ΣmA1(s1) and RA1(a) ∈ ΣrA1 , then there is at least a state t1 ∈ ΥA1
such that RA1(a) ∈ ΣrA1(t1) reachable from SuccA1(s1, a) by an autonomous exception-free
run σ1 = s11[a11]...sk−11 [ak−11 ]sk1 where s11 = SuccA1(s1, a) and sk1 = t1; (ii) if a ∈ ΣmA2(s2) and
RA2(a) ∈ ΣrA2 , then there is at least a state t2 ∈ ΥA2 such that RA2(a) ∈ ΣrA2(t2) reach-
able from SuccA2(s2, a) by an autonomous exception-free run σ2 = s12[a12]...sl−12 [al−12 ]sl2 where
s12 = SuccA2(s2, a) and sl2 = t2.
(1) If a ∈ ΣmA1∩Shared(A1, A2), we have RA1(a) = RA2(a) = ra since B1 and B2 are compos-
able. The transitions labeled by a enabled from s1 and s2 synchronize if SemCompa(A1, A2):
(1.1) if ra ∈ Shared(A1, A2), then the transitions enabeled from sk1 and sl2 labeled by ra synchro-
nize. If (ΣA1〈σ1〉 ∪ ΣA2〈σ2〉) ∩ Shared(A1, A2) = ∅, then the transitions of σ1 and σ2 are
interleaved asynchronously and produce autonomous exception-free runs between s11s12 and
sk1s
l
2. If (ΣA1〈σ1〉∪ΣA2〈σ2〉)∩Shared(A1, A2) 6= ∅, then all transitions labeled by shared ac-
tions in σ1 and σ2 synchronize and produce autonomous exception-free runs between s11s12
and sk1sl2. For each σ from those runs, if ΥA12〈σ〉 ∪ {SuccA12(sk1sl2, ra)} ⊆ Cmp(A1, A2),
then σ remains in A′12 if s1s2 ∈ Cmp(A1, A2). Otherwise, σ is removed in A′12 and
s1s2 6∈ ΥA′12 .
(1.2) if ra 6∈ Shared(A1, A2) and a ∈ ΣImA1 , then the transition enabling ra as output action is
interleaved form sk1t2 where t2 is reachable from s2 in A2. If ΣA1〈σ1〉 ∩ Shared(A1, A2) =
∅, the transitions of σ1 are interleaved and among the produced runs, we distinguish
the autonomous exception-free run σ = s11t2[a11]...sk−11 t2[ak−11 ]sk1t2 in A12 where t2 =
s12: if ΥA12〈σ〉 ∪ {SuccA12(sk1t2, ra)} ⊆ Cmp(A1, A2), then σ remains in A′12 if s1s2 ∈
Cmp(A1, A2). Otherwise, σ is removed inA′12 and s1s2 6∈ ΥA′12 . If ΣA1〈σ1〉∩Shared(A1, A2)
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6= ∅, then all transitions labeled by shared actions of σ1 synchronize with their equivalents
in A2 if they exist: either a deadlock state is hit and then s1s2 6∈ ΥA′12 , or there is an au-
tonomous exception-free run σ between s11s12 and sk1t2 containing only actions in ΣA1〈σ1〉
where t2 is reachable from s2 in A2. In the latter case, if ΥA12〈σ〉 ∪ {SuccA12(sk1t2, ra)} ⊆
Cmp(A1, A2), then σ remains in A′12 if s1s2 ∈ Cmp(A1, A2). Otherwise, σ is removed in
A′12 and s1s2 6∈ ΥA′12 . The same reasoning is adapted if a ∈ ΣImA2 .
Finally, if ¬SemCompa(A1, A2), s1s2 is deadlock in A12 and removed in A′12.
(2) If a ∈ ΣmA1 \ Shared(A1, A2), we have RA1(a) = ra 6∈ Shared(A1, A2). The transition
enabled from sk1 labeled by ra and that enabled from s1 labeled by a are interleaved in A12. If
ΣA1〈σ1〉 ∩ Shared(A1, A2) = ∅, the transitions of σ1 are interleaved and among the produced
runs, we distinguish the autonomous exception-free run σ = s1t2[a]s11t2[a11]...sk−11 t2[ak−11 ]sk1t2 in
A12 where s11t2 = Succ(s1t2, a) and s1t2 is reachable in A12: if ΥA12〈σ〉 ∪ SuccA12(sk1t2, ra) ⊆
Cmp(A1, A2), then σ remains in A′12 if s1t2 ∈ Cmp(A1, A2). Otherwise, σ is removed in A′12 and
(s1t2, a, s11t2) 6∈ δA′12 . If ΣA1〈σ1〉 ∩ Shared(A1, A2) 6= ∅, then all transitions labeled by shared
actions of σ1 synchronize with their equivalents in A2 if they exist: either a deadlock state is
hit and then all reachable states s1t2 in A12 are removed in A′12, or there is an autonomous
exception-free run σ between all s1t2 reachable in A12 and sk1t2 containing only actions in
{a}∪ΣA1〈σ1〉. In the latter case, if ΥA12〈σ〉∪{SuccA12(sk1t2, ra)} ⊆ Cmp(A1, A2), then σ remains
in A′12 for all s1t2 ∈ Cmp(A1, A2). Otherwise, σ is removed in A′12 and (s1t2, a, s11t2) 6∈ δA′12 .
The same reasoning is adapted if a ∈ ΣImA2 . Consequently, from proofs (1) and (2), we can
deduce that (B1‖B2).A is well-formed.
The following theorem is in the heart of incremental design of object-oriented component-
based systems. It is a straightforward generalization of interface automata associativity [7] to
behavioral contracts.
Theorem 2. The composition operation ‖ between compatible behavioral contracts is commu-
tative and associative.
Proof. This proof is adapted from [8]. Let us consider three behavioral contracts B1, B2, and
B3 mutually composable and compatible. The proof of commutativity is trivial. It is also easy
to check that ((B1‖B2)‖B3).I = (B1‖(B2‖B3)).I = ((B1‖B3)‖B2).I and ((B1‖B2)‖B3).O =
(B1‖(B2‖B3)).O = ((B1‖B3)‖B2).O. The proof of associativity is mainly required at the level
of interface automata. We denote B1.A, B2.A, and B3.A resp. by A1, A2, and A3. We
can obviously observe that the synchronization ⊗ of interface automata is commutative and
associative: we have (A1 ⊗ A2) ⊗ A3 = A1 ⊗ (A2 ⊗ A3) = (A1 ⊗ A3) ⊗ A2 = A1 ⊗ A2 ⊗ A3
(denoted A123). We consider projections Ai ⊗ Aj (denoted Aij) of A123 for i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
i 6= j. A state s1s2s3 is a deadlock state in A123 if sisj is a deadlock state in one of the
projections Aij . A state s1s2s3 is incompatible in A123 if there is a deadlock state d1d2d3 in
A123 autonomously reachable from s1s2s3. For l ≥ 0, a state s1s2s3 is l-incompatible if there is
a deadlock state d1d2d3 autonomously reachable from s1s2s3 by enabling at most l transitions.
It is sufficient to show that (B1‖B2‖B3).A (denoted A′123), for any insertion of parentheses,
is the associative product A123 by removing incompatible states. We follow two steps: (1) we
demonstrate that a state s1s2s3 is incompatible in A123 if there is a state sisj incompatible
in one of its projection Aij ; (2) we demonstrate that if there are transitions labeled by non-
autonomous actions (ΣImAij ∪ (ΣIAij ∩ ΣeAij )) reachable autonomously from sisj and removed in
(Bi‖Bj).A (denoted A′ij), then in the product A123 without those transitions, there is always
an autonomous run starting from s1s2s3 reaching a deadlock state.
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(1) Given a state s1s2s3 in A123 and a projection sisj of s1s2s3 k-incompatible in the product
Aij , we show that s1s2s3 is l′-incompatible with l′ ≤ l in A123. Given σ the smallest autonomous
run between sisj and a deadlock state didj in Aij . The proof is by induction: (base case 1)
if sisj ∈ Dead(Ai, Aj), then s1s2s3 is a deadlock state (0-incompatible in A123); (base case 2)
if sisj ∈ Comp(Ai, Aj) and s1s2s3 ∈ Dead(Aij ,Ak) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i, j} (0-incompatible in
A123); (step case) if the first transition of σ is labeled by an autonomous action, synchronized
or interleaved in A123, then the successor state t1t2t3 of s1s2s3 by enabling this action, is (l−1)-
incompatible. The proof is iterated inductively until reaching a deadlock state d1d2d3 (one of
the base cases).
(2) Given a state s = s1s2s3 incompatible in A123, we assume that there are transitions
labeled by non-autonomous actions a ∈ ΣImAij ∪ ΣIeAij , reachable from sisj in a sub-product Aij
and removed in A′ij and A′123. Only transitions (t, a, v) where a is hidden in A123 and their
projections onto Aij are transitions (titj , a, vivj) where a is non-autonomous and synchronized
by its corresponding output action in Ak for k ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i, j}, can be removed by this way.
Once (t, a, v) is removed from A123, the input non-autonomous action is no longer enabled from
titj because interface automata are deterministic. Consequently, the state t ∈ Dead(Aij , Ak).
Hence, after removing (t, a, v) from A123 there is always an autonomous run between s and a
deadlock state, especially t.
The compatibility check procedure of two behavioral contracts is similar to that described
in [7] for interface automata, by considering the semantic layer of actions and the new definition
of autonomous runs. The linear complexity of the proposed algorithm is extended by satisfi-
ability decision problems of semantic compatibility conditions of shared input/output method
actions. The original algorithm becomes a semi-algorithm on account of the various satisfiability
problems which are either decidable (propositional logic) or not (arithmetic, etc).
5 Refinement
Refinement embodies with more details an abstract specification of a component in a more
concrete one. It guarantees a safe substitutability of an abstract version of a component by
a refined one. We propose a refinement approach for behavioral contracts, at protocol and
semantic levels, suitable to the object-oriented context. We start by introducing refinement at
the level of interface automata.
5.1 Expanding simulation
The original refinement relation of interface automata is contravariant [7] on output actions i.e.,
it reverses sub-typing considered as inclusion of action sets: an abstract version of an interface
automaton A issues the same or more outputs, and accepts the same or fewer inputs than its
refined version A′. It is based on an alternating simulation relation [4]: each output event of
A′ is simulated by at least the same event in A, and each input event of A is simulated exactly
by the same in A′. At the protocol level in OOCBD, our approach of refinement ensures that
a refined specification of a component may (i) provide more methods than the abstract one,
and (ii) contain more details about common provided methods with the abstract one, which
are output and local method calls encapsulated in their bodies. These requirements lead us to
consider refinement relation to be covariant on both input and output actions i.e., it preserves
sub-typing for both kinds of action sets: A′ refines A if A accepts (resp. issues) fewer inputs
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(resp. outputs) than A′. We base our approach on the so called expanding simulation: each
input, output, or local event of A is simulated in A′ by the same one followed or preceded by
other events.
To formalize this relation, we define the closure set ClosA(s,Σ) of s ∈ ΥA under actions in
Σ ⊆ ΣA by the largest set Υ ⊆ ΥA such that s ∈ Υ and if t ∈ Υ, v = SuccA(t, a), and a ∈ Σ,
then v ∈ Υ i.e., ClosA(s,Σ) contains states reachable from the state s by enabling actions of Σ.
Definition 10. Given two interface automata A and A′, a binary relation & ⊆ ΥA×ΥA′ is an
expanding simulation from A to A′ iff for all ss′ ∈ ΥA ×ΥA′ and a ∈ ΣA(s) where s & s′ and
t = SuccA(s, a), the following conditions hold:
(1) if a ∈ ΣOmA (s) ∪ ΣIrA(s) ∪ ΣIeA(s), then a ∈ ΣA′(s′) and t & t′ for t′ = SuccA′(s′, a);
(2) if a ∈ ΣImA (s)∪ΣHmA (s), then a ∈ ΣA′(s′), and there is a set Σ ⊆ ((ΣautA′ \ΣOrA′ ) \ΣeA′) \ΣA
and a state t′ ∈ ClosA′(SuccA(s′, a),Σ) such that t & t′;
(3) if a ∈ ΣOrA (s) ∪ ΣHrA (s), then there is a state v′ ∈ ClosA′(s′,Σ) such that a ∈ ΣA′(v′),
Σ = ((ΣautA′ \ ΣOrA′ ) \ ΣeA′) \ ΣA, and t & t′ for t′ = SuccA′(v′, a);
(4) if a ∈ ΣOeA (s) ∪ ΣHeA (s), then there is a state v′ ∈ ClosA′(s′,Σ) such that a ∈ ΣA′(v′),
Σ = ((ΣautA′ \ (ΣOeA′ ∪ ΣOrA′ )) ∪ ΣIeA′) \ ΣA, and t & t′ for t′ = SuccA′(v′, a).
Our expanding simulation relation pinpoints where refinement details are added in the ab-
stract version of an interface automaton. Condition (1) of Definition 10 states that every
transition labeled by an output method action, or an input return or exception action must be
matched by a transition labeled by the same action in A′. Method calls sent to the environment,
the reception of their return values, and catching their thrown exceptions, cannot be refined.
Condition (2) states that every transition labeled by an input or hidden method action in A
is matched in A′ by a transition labeled by the same action followed by zero or more transitions
labeled by a “subset” of new autonomous non-exception actions in ((ΣautA′ \ ΣOrA′ ) \ ΣeA′) \ ΣA.
A provided public method in the abstraction of a component can be refined by adding to its
body new private or public method calls. In addition, since providing private methods is not
specified by actions in interface automata (cf. Section 3), our simulation relation allows adding
refinement details about private methods after their calls.
Condition (3) states that every transition labeled by an output or hidden return action a
in A is matched in A′ by zero or more transitions labeled by new autonomous non-exception
actions in ((ΣautA′ \ ΣOrA′ ) \ ΣeA′) \ ΣA followed by a transition labeled by a. The return event of
a private or public provided method in the abstraction is computed based on the return values
of new calls of private or public methods added as refinement details.
Condition (4) states that every transition labeled by an output or hidden exception action
a in A is matched in A′ by zero or more transitions labeled either by new autonomous and
hidden exception actions in (ΣautA′ \ (ΣOeA′ ∪ ΣOrA′ )) \ ΣA, or by new input exception actions in
ΣIeA′ \ ΣA, followed by a transition labeled by a. The exception events of a provided private or
public method in the abstraction is the propagation of catching exception events of new calls
of private or public methods added as refinement details.
We infer from conditions of Definition 10 that extra new input method actions are not
considered as refinement details by the expanding simulation relation, which obviously makes
sense. By cons, it allows the extension of interface automata by adding protocols related to
additional methods provided by a component extended interface. They can be enabled for
example separately from the initial state. We define the refinement relation as follows.
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Definition 11. A′ refines A (A  A′) iff
(1) ΣIA ⊆ ΣIA′, ΣOA ⊆ ΣOA′, ΣHA ⊆ ΣHA′, and
(2) there is an expanding simulation & from A to A′ such that ıA & ıA′.
A trivial consequence of condition (1) of Definition 11 is covariance from A to A′ on method,
return, and exception actions: ΣmA ⊆ ΣmA′ , ΣrA ⊆ ΣrA′ , and ΣeA ⊆ ΣeA′ . Condition (2) requires the
existence of an expanding simulation from A to A′ relating their initial states ıA and ıA′ and
recursively propagated to their successor states.
SubRouteBuilder
-bdd:{seg:Seg 7→ sw:Switch}ˆmaxs
+chain(start:nat,end:nat):{segs:Segˆmax,useful nb:nat}
+checkLocs(tel:real,ts:nat,hel:real,hs:nat):nat
Component
SRB
RouteBuilder
Figure 7: Extended version of SubRouteBuilder.
1’ 2’ 3’ 5’
4’
6’ 7’ 8’
10’
9’
isCovered? checkLocs! localized?
unlocalized?
no!
yes! computeVmaz? chain!
uncontSW?default!
vmazSegs?result!
IN: isCovered, computeVmaz, vmazSegs, uncontSW, localized, unlocalized
OUT: checkLocs, chain, yes, no, result, default
1’ 2’3’
chain?
vmazSegs!
localized!
unlocalized!
checkLocs?
IN: chain, checkLocs
OUT: vmazSegs, uncontSW, localized, unlocalized
(a) A′m (MCU) (b) A′s (SRB)
Figure 8: Refined interface automata of MCU and SRB.
Example 5. After receiving a train coverage request, MCU asks SRB to check if tel and hel
are really on segments ts and hs respectively by calling the method checkLocs, presented in
Figure 8(left), as a new service of the class SubRouteBuilder and the interface RouteBuilder.
If true, SRB responds by sending the status (localized), and MCU in turn, responds OBD, via
DEU, by returning yes if the train is completely (or partially) included in its coverage area.
Otherwise, SRB throws the exception unlocalized to MCU, which in turn, propagates it to DEU
by throwing the exception no. In A′m shown in Figure 8(a), the method call checkLocs! is encap-
sulated in runs describing the body of isCovered provided by MCU. Providing the public method
checkLocs is equally depicted in the interface automaton A′s shown in Figure 8(b) by a new input
method action enabled separately from ıA′s = 1
′. A′m and A′s resp. refine Am and As (shown
resp. in Figure 3(c) and Figure 5): condition (1) of Definition 11 is met by A′m and Am, as well
by A′s and As, and there are two expanding simulations &m= {11′, 23′, 36′, 47′, 58′, 69′, 7(10′)}
from Am to A′m with ıAm &m ıA′m and &s= {11′, 22′} from As to A′s with ıAs &s ıA′s .
5.2 Semantic substitutability
The semantic substitutability of method actions between an abstract and a concrete versions of a
component behavioral contract is based on behavioral sub-typing principles introduced in [5, 12]:
in the refined specification, a common provided method must have a weaker precondition, a
stronger termination postcondition, and does not introduce exceptions by supplying a stronger
exception condition, than the abstract one. Inversely, a common method call must have, in
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refinement, a stronger precondition and a weaker postcondition than abstraction. Given two
behavioral contracts B and B′, we denote B.A by A and B′.A by A′.
Definition 12. Given an action a ∈ ΣImA , B′.I(a) = (P ′a, S′a, Q′a, E′a) substitutes B.I(a) =
(Pa, Sa, Qa, Ea) i.e., SemSuba(B,B′), iff for all (i, f, o) ∈ ΨiA(a)×ΛA(a)×ΨoA(a), the following
conditions hold:
(1) Pa[i]⇒ P ′a[i], Qa[i, f, o]⇐ Q′a[i, f, o], Ea[i, f, o]⇐ E′a[i, f, o], and
(2) Pa[i] ∧ S′a[i, f, o]⇒ Sa[i, f, o].
Given b ∈ ΣOmA , B′.O(b) = (P ′b, Q′b) substitutes B.O(b) = (Pb, Qb) i.e., SemSubb(B,B′) iff
for all (i, o) ∈ ΨiA(b)×ΨoA(b), the following condition holds:
(3) Pb[i]⇐ P ′b[i] and Qb[i, o]⇒ Q′b[i, o].
The following property is evident based on definitions 5 and 12. Correctness, exception, and
termination conditions preservation is what we expect for a correct refinement at the semantic
level of provided methods: if the refined semantics of a provided method satisfies condition
(2) of Definition 12, then any property holding for a specification S under the precondition
in the abstract method semantics, holds also for the refined specification S′ under the same
precondition, and thus S′ may be used instead of S [13, 3].
Property 1. Given a ∈ ΣImA where SemSuba(B,B′), for all (i, f, o) ∈ ΨiA(a)×ΛA(a)×ΨoA(a),
• Pa[i] ∧ S′a[i, f, o]⇒ Qa[i, f, o],
• Pa[i] ∧ S′a[i, f, o]⇒ Ea[i, f, o], or
• Pa[i] ∧ S′a[i, f, o]⇒ Qa[i, f, o] ∧ ¬Ea[i, f, o].
resp. iff a is correct, throws exceptions, or terminates with respect to B.I(a).
Property 2 says that the semantic compatibility validity of shared observable method actions,
between behavioral contracts of a component and its environment, is preserved by the semantic
substitutability. The property is obvious based on Definition 6 and conditions (1) and (3) of
Definition 12. Given a behavioral contract E, we set E.A = AE .
Property 2. Given an action a ∈ Shared(A,AE) ∩ ΣmA , for all (i, o) ∈ ΨiA(a) × ΨoA(a), if
SemSuba(B,B′), then SemCompa(B,E) = SemCompa(B′, E) .
Finally, we can define refinement of behavioral contracts based on refinement of interface
automata and the semantic substitutability of observable method actions.
Definition 13. B′ refines B (B w B′) iff A  A′ and for all a ∈ ΣImA ∪ΣOmA , SemSuba(B,B′).
5.3 Refinement properties
In this subsection, we present the properties and requirements under which our refinement
approach allows independent implementability of components using their behavioral contracts.
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Reflexivity and transitivity
Lemma 3 states that the expanding simulation between interface automata is a transitive rela-
tion. This result is necessary to prove that the refinement relation w is a preorder (Theorem 4)
i.e., a behavioral contract can be gradually refined in several steps while remaining consistent
with its abstract specification.
Lemma 3. given three interface automata A, A′, and A′′, and two expanding simulations
&′ ⊆ ΥA × ΥA′ and &′′ ⊆ ΥA′ × ΥA′′, then the composite relation &′′ ◦ &′ ⊆ ΥA × ΥA′′ is an
expanding simulation.
Proof. We set some notations. Given an interface automaton M , a state s ∈ ΥM , and a set of
actions Σ ⊆ ΣM , we define recursively CloskM (s,Σ) by: Clos0M (s,Σ) = {s} and CloskM (s,Σ) =
Closk−1M (s,Σ) ∪ {t = SuccM (s, a) | a ∈ Σ ∧ s ∈ Closk−1M (s,Σ)} for k > 0. We prove that
&′′ ◦ &′= {ss′′ ∈ ΥA × ΥA′′ | (∃s′ ∈ ΥA′ | s &′ s′ &′′ s′′)} is an expanding simulation. For
all s ∈ ΥA, based on Definition 10, we state the following properties for all a ∈ ΣA(s) and
t = SuccA(s, a):
(1) if a ∈ ΣOmA (s) ∪ ΣIrA(s) ∪ ΣIeA(s), a ∈ ΣA′(s′), a ∈ ΣA′′(s′′), and t &′ t′ &′′ t′′ for t′ =
SuccA′(s′, a) and t′′ = SuccA′′(s′′, a), that is t &′′ ◦ &′ t′′;
(2) if a ∈ ΣImA (s)∪ΣHmA (s), then a ∈ ΣA′(s′), and there is a set Σ′ ⊆ ((ΣautA′ \ΣOrA′ )\ΣeA′)\ΣA and
a state t′ ∈ ClosA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′) such that t &′ t′. We have to prove that a ∈ ΣA′′(s′′),
and there is a set Σ ⊆ ((ΣautA′′ \ΣOrA′′) \ΣeA′′) \ΣA and a state t′′ ∈ ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′, a),Σ)
such that t &′ t′ &′′ t′′? We consider CloskA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′) ⊆ ClosA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′)
where k is the first natural such that t′ ∈ CloskA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′). We define the states
s′i ∈ CloskA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′)∪{s′} inductively on 0 ≤ i ≤ k+1: s′0 = s, s′1 = SuccA′(s′0, a),
s′i ∈ Closi−1A′ (s′1,Σ′) \ Closi−2A′ (s′1,Σ′) for i > 1. We define s′′i and Υ′′i inductively on i:
(2.1) i = 0: s′′0 = s′′ (we recall that s′0 &′′ s′′0); Υ′′0 = {s′′0};
(2.2) i = 1: a ∈ ΣA′′(s′′0), there is a set Σ′′0 ⊆ ((ΣautA′′ \ ΣOrA′′) \ ΣeA′′) \ ΣA′ and a state s′′1 ∈
ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′0, a),Σ′′0) such that s′1 &′′ s′′1; Υ′′1 = Υ′′0 ∪ ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′0, a),Σ′′0);
(2.3) i > 1: for all bi−1 ∈ ΣA′(s′i−1) ∩ Σ′ and s′i = SuccA′(s′i−1, bi−1), we have three cases:
(2.3.1) if bi−1 ∈ ΣOmA′ (s′i−1) ∪ ΣIrA′(s′i−1), then bi−1 ∈ ΣA′′(s′′i−1) and s′i &′′ s′′i where the
state s′′i = SuccA′′(s′′i−1, bi−1); Υ′′i = Υ′′i−1 ∪ {s′′i = SuccA′′(s′′i−1, bi−1) | bi−1 ∈
(ΣOmA′ (s′′i−1) ∪ ΣIrA′(s′′i−1)) ∩ Σ′};
(2.3.2) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHmA′ (s′i−1), bi−1 ∈ ΣA′′(s′′i−1), and there is Σ′′i−1 ⊆ ((ΣautA′′ \ ΣOrA′′) \
ΣeA′′) \ ΣA′ and s′′i ∈ ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′i−1, bi−1),Σ′′i−1) such that s′i &′′ s′′i ; Υ′′i =
Υ′′i−1 ∪ (
⋃
φ ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′i−1, bi−1),Σ′′i−1)) where φ ≡ bi−1 ∈ ΣHmA′ (s′i−1) ∩ Σ′;
(2.3.3) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHrA′ (s′i−1), there is a state v′′i−1 ∈ ClosA′′(s′′i−1,Σ′′i−1) such that bi−1 ∈
ΣA′′(v′′i−1), Σ′′i−1 = ((ΣautA′′ \ ΣOrA′′) \ ΣeA′′) \ ΣA′ , and s′i &′′ s′′i for the state s′′i =
SuccA′′(v′′i−1, bi−1); Υ′′i = Υ′′i−1 ∪ (
⋃
φ ClosA′′(s′′i−1,Σ′′i−1)) ∪ {SuccA′′(v′′i−1, bi−1) |
(∀v′′i−1 | φ)} where φ ≡ bi−1 ∈ ΣHrA′ (s′i−1) ∩ Σ′.
We deduce from (2.1) and (2.2) that a ∈ ΣA′′(s′′). Given s′k ∈ CloskA′(SuccA′(s′, a),Σ′)
where s′k = t′, according to (2.3), there is a set Υ′′k+1 ⊆ ClosA′′(SuccA′′(s′′, a),Σ) where
Σ ⊆ ((ΣautA′′ \ΣOrA′′) \ΣeA′′) \ΣA and t′′ ∈ Υ′′k+1 such that t &′ t′ &′′ t′′, that is t &′′ ◦ &′ t′′.
(3) if a ∈ ΣOrA (s)∪ΣHrA (s), there is v′ ∈ ClosA′(s′,Σ′) such that Σ′ = ((ΣautA′ \ΣOrA′ )\ΣeA′)\ΣA,
a ∈ ΣA′(v′), and t &′ t′ for t′ = SuccA′(v′, a). We have to prove that there is a state
v′′ ∈ ClosA′′(s′′,Σ) such that Σ = ((ΣautA′′ \ΣOrA′′)\ΣeA′′)\ΣA, a ∈ ΣA′′(v′′), and t &′ t′ &′′ t′′
for t′′ = SuccA′′(v′′, a)? We consider CloskA′(s′,Σ′) ⊆ ClosA′(s′,Σ′) where k is the first
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natural such that v′ ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′). We define the states s′i ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′) inductively on
0 ≤ i ≤ k: s′0 = s′ and s′i ∈ ClosiA′(s′,Σ′)\Closi−1A′ (s′,Σ′) for i > 0. For all bi ∈ ΣA′(s′i)∩Σ′
and s′i+1 = SuccA′(s′i, bi), we define equally s′′i and Υ′′i inductively on i:
(3.1) i = 0: s′′0 = s′′ (s′0 &′′ s′′0); Υ′′0 = {s′′0};
(3.2) i > 0: for all bi−1 ∈ ΣA′(s′i−1) ∩ Σ′ and s′i = SuccA′(s′i−1, bi−1), we have three cases:
(3.2.1) if bi−1 ∈ ΣOmA′ (s′i−1) ∪ ΣIrA′(s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.1);
(3.2.2) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHmA′ (s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.2);
(3.2.3) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHrA′ (s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.3).
Given s′k ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′) where s′k = v′, and s′′k ∈ Υ′′k where s′k &′′ s′′k, according to (3.2),
there is v′′k ∈ Υ′′k ⊆ ClosA′′(s′′, ((ΣautA′′ \ ΣOrA′′) \ ΣeA′′) \ ΣA) such that a ∈ ΣA′′(v′′k), and
t &′ t′ &′′ t′′ for t′′ = SuccA′′(v′′k , a), that is t &′′ ◦ &′ t′′.
(4) if a ∈ ΣOeA (s) ∪ ΣHeA (s), there is v′ ∈ ClosA′(s′,Σ′) such that Σ′ = ((ΣautA′ \ (ΣOeA′ ∪ ΣOrA′ )) ∪
ΣIeA′) \ΣA, a ∈ ΣA′(v′), and t &′ t′ for t′ = SuccA′(v′, a). We have to prove that there is a
state v′′ ∈ ClosA′′(s′′,Σ) such that Σ = ((ΣautA′′ \ (ΣOeA′′ ∪ ΣOrA′′)) ∪ ΣIeA′′) \ ΣA, a ∈ ΣA′′(v′′),
and t &′ t′ &′′ t′′ for t′′ = SuccA′′(v′′, a)? We consider CloskA′(s′,Σ′) ⊆ ClosA′(s′,Σ′) where
k is the first natural such that v′ ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′). We define the states s′i ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′)
inductively on 0 ≤ i ≤ k: s′0 = s′ and s′i ∈ ClosiA′(s′,Σ′) \Closi−1A′ (s′,Σ′) for i > 0. For all
bi ∈ ΣA′(s′i) ∩ Σ′ and s′i+1 = SuccA′(s′i, bi), we define equally s′′i and Υ′′i inductively on i:
(4.1) i = 0: s′′0 = s′′ (s′0 &′′ s′′0); Υ′′0 = {s′′0};
(4.2) i > 0: for all bi−1 ∈ ΣA′(s′i−1) ∩ Σ′ and s′i = SuccA′(s′i−1, bi−1), we have four cases:
(4.2.1) if bi−1 ∈ ΣOmA′ (s′i−1)∪ΣIrA′(s′i−1)∪ΣIeA′(s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.1);
(4.2.2) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHmA′ (s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.2);
(4.2.3) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHrA′ (s′i−1), then the definition goes as in (2.3.3);
(4.2.4) if bi−1 ∈ ΣHeA′ (s′i−1), then there is a state v′′i−1 ∈ ClosA′′(s′′i−1,Σ′′i−1) such that
bi−1 ∈ ΣA′′(v′′i−1), Σ′′i−1 = ((ΣautA′′ \(ΣOeA′′∪ΣOrA′′))∪ΣIeA′′)\ΣA′ , and s′i &′′ s′′i for s′′i =
SuccA′′(v′′i−1, bi−1); Υ′′i = Υ′′i−1 ∪ (
⋃
φ ClosA′′(s′′i−1,Σ′′i−1)) ∪ {SuccA′′(v′′i−1, bi−1) |
(∀v′′i−1 | φ)} where φ ≡ bi−1 ∈ ΣHeA′ (s′i−1) ∩ Σ′.
Given s′k ∈ CloskA′(s′,Σ′) where s′k = v′, and s′′k ∈ Υ′′k where s′k &′′ s′′k, according to (4.2),
there is v′′k ∈ Υ′′k ⊆ ClosA′′(s′′, ((ΣautA′′ \ (ΣOeA′′ ∪ΣOrA′′)) ∪ΣIeA′′) \ΣA) such that a ∈ ΣA′′(v′′k),
and t &′ t′ &′′ t′′ for t′′ = SuccA′′(v′′k , a), that is t &′′ ◦ &′ t′′.
From (1), (2), (3), and (4), we deduce that &′′ ◦ &′ ⊆ ΥA×ΥA′′ is an expanding simulation.
Theorem 4. The refinement relation w between behavioral contracts is a preorder i.e., reflexive
and transitive.
Proof. Given three behavioral contracts B, B′, and B′′ where B.A = A, B′.A = A′, and
B′′.A = A′′. We have to prove thatB w B (reflexivity) and ifB w B′ andB′ w B′′, thenB w B′′
(transitivity)? For reflexivity, it is trivial that A  A and for all a ∈ ΣmA , SemSuba(B,B). For
transitivity, we have to prove that (1) if A  A′ and A′  A′′, then A  A′′, and (2) for all
a ∈ ΣmA , if SemSuba(B,B′) and SemSuba(B′, B′′), then SemSuba(B,B′′)?
(1) Based on Definition 11 and the assumptions A  A′ and A′  A′′, we can deduce that
ΣmA ⊆ ΣmA′′ , ΣrA ⊆ ΣrA′′ , ΣeA ⊆ ΣeA′′ , ΣIA ⊆ ΣIA′′ , ΣOA ⊆ ΣOA′′ , and ΣHA ⊆ ΣHA′′ . It remains to
prove that there is an expanding simulation & ⊆ ΥA × ΥA′′ such that ıA & ıA′′ . We have,
as assumptions, two expanding simulations &′ ⊆ ΥA × ΥA′ and &′′ ⊆ ΥA′ × ΥA′′ such that
ıA &′ ıA′ &′′ ıA′′ . We choose the composite relation &′′ ◦ &′ ⊆ ΥA × ΥA′′ . From Lemma 3,
&′′ ◦ &′ is an expanding simulation such that ıA &′′ ◦ &′ ıA′′ .
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(2) Based on Definition 12 and the assumptions SemSuba(B,B′) and SemSuba(B′, B′′) for all
a ∈ ΣmA , we can deduce that if a ∈ ΣImA , then for all (i, f, o) ∈ ΨiA(a)× ΛA(a)×ΨoA(a), Pa[i]⇒
P ′′a [i] (from Pa[i] ⇒ P ′a[i] ⇒ P ′′a [i]), Qa[i, f, o] ⇐ Q′′a[i, f, o] (from Qa[i, f, o] ⇐ Q′a[i, f, o] ⇐
Q′′a[i, f, o]), Ea[i, f, o] ⇐ E′′a [i, f, o] (from Ea[i, f, o] ⇐ E′a[i, f, o] ⇐ E′′a [i, f, o]), and Pa[i] ∧
S′′a [i, f, o] ⇒ Sa[i, f, o] (from Pa[i] ∧ S′a[i, f, o] ⇒ Sa[i, f, o], P ′a[i] ∧ S′′a [i, f, o] ⇒ S′a[i, f, o], and
Pa[i] ⇒ P ′a[i]) where B.I(a) = (Pa, Ba, Qa, Ea), B′.I(a) = (P ′a, B′a, Q′a, E′a), and B′′.I(a) =
(P ′′a , B′′a , Q′′a, E′′a). Else if a ∈ ΣOmA , then for all (i, o) ∈ ΨiA(a) × ΨoA(a), Pa[i] ⇐ P ′′a [i] (from
Pa[i] ⇐ P ′a[i] ⇐ P ′′a [i]) and Qa[i, o] ⇒ Q′′a[i, o] (from Qa[i, o] ⇒ Q′a[i, o] ⇒ Q′′a[i, o]) where
B.O(a) = (Pa, Qa), B′.O(a) = (P ′a, Q′a), B′′.O(a) = (P ′′a , Q′′a).
Independent implementability
Refinement is expected to allow independent implementability of components: compatible be-
havioral contracts can be refined separately, while still maintaining compatibility. It lets indus-
trials unrestricted to outsource the implementation of components by different suppliers, after
the refinement process, even if they do not communicate [8].
Our refinement approach guarantees the consistency between two behavioral contracts B
and B′ where B w B′ if they are considered “isolated” from their environment. However, it
is highly generic, and does not prevent the introduction of poorly designed behaviors in their
interface automata. Since refinement may issues new outputs, the designer should “safely”
define it to preserve compatibility with the environment within the abstraction is incorporated
without altering their communication scenarios. For example, according to Definition 2 and
conditions (2) and (3) of Definition 10, the proposed expanding simulation relation preserves
well-formedness in refinement only for method actions events common with abstraction. By
cons, it does not guarantee that new method actions events are followed necessarily by their
return events. In general, the higher the refinement design respects environment requirements
and well-formedness, the safer it is considered to be.
We provide the weakest conditions under which the refinement of a behavioral contract
is considered to be safe with respect to its environment. To formalize these requirements,
let us consider three behavioral contracts B1, B′1 and B2 where B1 and B2 are composable
and compatible, B1 w B′1, and B′1 is composable with B2. Let B1.A = A1, B′1.A = A′1,
B2.A = A2, (B1|B2).A = A12, and (B′1|B2).A = A′12, we set EnabRiseDead(A1, A2) = {a ∈
(ΣImA12 ∪ ΣIeA12) ∩ ΣA12〈σ〉 | σ ∈ ΘA12(d1d2), d1d2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2)}: the set of non-autonomous
actions enabled by runs σ ∈ ΘA12(d1d2) for all d1d2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2). Since B1 and B2 are
compatible, EnabRiseDead(A1, A2) 6= ∅ if Dead(A1, A2) 6= ∅. Given & an expanding simulation
from A1 to A′1 such that ıA1 & ıA′1 , we state the following definition.
Definition 14. B′1 is a safe refinement of B1 with respect to B2, denoted B1 wsB2 B′1, if the
following conditions hold on A1, A′1, and A2:
(1) for all d′1d2 ∈ Dead(A′1, A2), there is a state d1d2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2) such that d1 & d′1 or
d′1 ∈ ClosA′1(c′1,ΣA′1 \ ΣA1) and d1 & c′1;
(2) Shared(A′1, A2) ∩ EnabRiseDead(A1, A2) = ∅.
Condition (1) says that A′12 does not introduce new deadlocks compared to A12 by guaran-
teeing that all states in Dead(A′1, A2) are simulated by states in Dead(A1, A2). Condition (2)
says that A′1 does not share non-autonomous actions in EnabledRiseDead(A1, A2) with A2 if
they are enabled by the environment of A12, may lead inevitably to deadlock states. We claim
the following theorem.
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Theorem 5. If B1 wsB2 B′1, then B′1 is compatible with B2 and B1‖B2 w B′1‖B2.
Proof. Under the theorem assumptions, we have to demonstrate that (1) Cmp(A′1, A2) 6= ∅ and
ıA′12 ∈ Cmp(A′1, A2), and (2) A12  A′12 and for all a ∈ ΣImA12 ∪ ΣOmA12 , SemSuba(B1‖B2, B′1‖B2)?
(1) First, we prove that ıA′12 cannot be a deadlock state: if ıA′12 ∈ Dead(A′1, A2), then, from
B1 wsB2 B′1 (condition (1) of Definition 14), ıA1ıA2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2) which is in contradiction with
the compatibility of B1 and B2. Therefore, we conclude that ıA′12 6∈ Dead(A′1, A2). Second, we
prove that each σ′, starting from ıA′12 and ending by a deadlock state in Dead(A
′
1, A2), contains
at least a transition labeled by a ∈ ΣImA′12∪Σ
Ie
A′12
: from B1 wsB2 B′1 (condition (1) of Definition 14),
we can deduce that each run σ′ starting from ıA′12 and reaching d
′
1d2 ∈ Dead(A′1, A2) is the image
of a run σ in A12 starting form ıA12 and reaching d1d2 ∈ Dead(A1, A2) such that d1 & d′1 or
d′1 ∈ ClosA′1(c′1,ΣA′1 \ ΣA1) where d1 & c′1: σ′ can be decomposed on fragments matching each
transition of σ. We consider that σ = s0t0[a0]...[an−1]sntn in A12 where n ∈ N∗, s0t0 = ıA12 , and
sntn ∈ Dead(A1, A2). Since B1 w B′1, we decompose σ′ inductively on 0 ≤ l ≤ n, to fragments
σ′l as follows:
• l = 0: σ′0 is the path of length 0 defined by s′0t0 = ıA′1ıA2 (we have s0 & s
′
0);
• 0 < l ≤ n: σ′l is the concatenation of σ′l−1 with a run α′l (matching sl−1tl−1[al−1]sltl)
starting form s′l−1tl−1, reaching s′ltl where sl & s′l, and containing necessarily a transition
labeled by al−1, and zero or more transitions labeled by autonomous exception-free actions
in the set ΣautA′1 \ΣA1 , if al−1 ∈ ΣA1\Σ
e
A1 , or zero or more transitions labeled by autonomous
and exception actions in (ΣautA′1 ∪ Σ
Ie
A′1
) \ ΣA1 otherwise (the case where al−1 ∈ ΣeA1).
As B1 and B2 are compatible, there is a transition sktk[ak]sk+1tk+1 in σ such that k ∈ N<n and
ak ∈ ΣImA12 ∪ΣIeA12 . We can observe, based on the previous inductive decomposition, that for the
image σ′ = σ′n of σ, ΣA′12〈σ′〉 contains at least the action ak belonging as well to ΣImA′12 ∪ Σ
Ie
A′12
:
from B1 wsB2 B′1, ak ∈ EnabRiseDead(A1, A2) is a non autonomous action not shared between
A′1 and A2 (condition (2) of Definition 14). In addition, σ′ reach s′ntn ∈ Dead(A′1, A2) such
that sn & s′n or s′n is reachable by a fragment of σ′ enabling actions in ΣA′1 \ ΣA1 from a state
c′n ∈ ΥA′1 where sn & c′n. Consequently, we deduce that ıA′12 ∈ Cmp(A′1, A2).
(2) The condition (1) of Definition 11 is met obviously with A = A12 and A′ = A′12. It
remains to prove that there is an expanding simulation &′ from A′12 to A12 such that ıA12 &′ ıA′12 .
We take &′ defined by {(s1s2, s′1s2) ∈ ΥA12 ×ΥA′12 | s1 & s′1 ∧ s2 ∈ Cmp(A1, A2)}. Finally, it is
obvious that for all a ∈ ΣImA12 ∪ ΣOmA12 , SemSuba(B1‖B2, B′1‖B2) is true.
Given a fourth behavioral contract B′2 such that B′2 is composable with B′1 and B2 w B′2, the
independent implementability property of behavioral contracts is established by the following
corollary, which is obviously deductible from theorems 4 and 5.
Corollary 6. If B1 wsB2 B′1 and B2 wsB′1 B
′
2, then B′1 and B′2 are compatible behavioral contracts
and B1‖B2 w B′1‖B′2.
Proof. From Theorem 5, we have B′1 and B2 are compatible and B1‖B2 w B′1‖B2. We have also,
from the corollary premises and Theorem 5, B′1 and B′2 are compatible and B′1‖B2 w B′1‖B′2.
As w is a preorder (Theorem 4), we can conclude that B1‖B2 w B′1‖B′2.
Given two interface automata A and A′, the refinement relation A′  A is checkable in time
O((|δA| + |δA′ |).(|ΥA| + |ΥA′ |)) [4, 8], where |S| is the cardinality of a set S. The algorithm
of checking refinement between interface automata, in our approach, can be deduced naturally
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form that proposed in [7]. Safe refinement can be checked in linear time by forward or back-
ward traversals, that is B1 wsB2 B′1 can be checked in time O(|δ(B1|B2).A|.|δ(B′1|B2).A|). The
previous complexity is extended by the satisfiability decision problems related to the semantic
substitutability conditions of common observable method actions between the refinement of a
behavioral contract and its abstraction.
6 Conclusions
This report is a contribution to the design of object-oriented component-based applications
using behavioral contracts. This formalism combines protocol and semantic levels of component
interface specifications. The protocol level is designed by means of interface automata and
the semantic level is defined on methods by pre/postconditions and specifications stated on
their parameters and components attributes. The optimistic approach of interface automata
composition is accordingly adapted to fulfill the interaction aspects between components in the
object-oriented context. Refinement of behavioral contracts is defined from the perspective of
OOCBD. It is based on a simulation relation allowing addition of refinement details about the
behavioral protocol and semantics of provided services common to refined and abstract versions
of a component behavioral contract. The work is illustrated by a design case study of trains
protection functions in railway CBTC systems.
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